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SHADES OF GRAY: THE FUNCTIONALITY
DOCTRINE AND WHY TRADEMARK
PROTECTION SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED
TO UNIVERSITY COLOR SCHEMES
KRISTEN E. KNAUF*
I. INTRODUCTION

One of the time-honored traditions of the collegiate experience in this
country is the dedication to a school's fight colors. During game days on
college campuses, it is common to see thousands of students and alumni alike
dressed head-to-toe in the two-color scheme of their alma mater. The mere
sight of these two colors paired together stirs the emotions of many.
Universities, of course, recognize the revenue stream that exists in selling
merchandise featuring its color scheme. Usually, merchandising is licensed to
third parties who wish to use the color scheme along with a university's
registered marks, such as its logos or mascot. Yet, recent events have left
many wondering about the extent to which trademark law protects
universities' color schemes when they are not accompanied by other marks.
There is precedent to suggest that schools have trademark rights to their school
colors, but there is usually some other registered symbol or mark that makes
trademark infringement easier to find. The question of whether a university
color scheme alone can merit trademark protection is quite novel.
This Article asserts that university color schemes, and colors in general,
should not be protected under current trademark law. The color scheme, by
itself, is functional and thus cannot be trademarked under the Lanham Act.
Part II addresses the essential elements of trademark law under the Lanham
Act and examines grounds for protection of a mark. Part II also discusses the
functionality doctrine as a bar to trademark protection. Part III analyzes the
different approaches taken by courts in either granting or denying trademark
protection to university color schemes. Part IV looks at recent controversies
* Kristen Knauf is an associate at Kennedy, Clark & Williams P.C. in Dallas, Texas. She earned a
B.A. in Political Science and Spanish from the University of Wisconsin-Madison (2006) and a J.D.
from Marquette University Law School (2010). She also graduated with the National Sports Law
Institute's Sports Law Certificate. This Article was awarded the second place prize in the 2010
Wisconsin State Bar Intellectual Property Section Writing Competition.
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caused by unauthorized uses of university color schemes. Finally, Part V
explains why university color schemes are functional and therefore cannot be
given trademark protection.
II. THE BASICS OF TRADEMARK LAW

The Lanham Act, the regulatory authority of U.S. trademark law, defines a
trademark as:
[A]ny word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona
fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on
the principal register established by this chapter, to identify
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.'
"A predominant objective of trademark law is to prevent consumer
confusion in the marketplace." 2 To further this objective and to protect the
commercial interests of trademark owners, the Lanham Act provides a cause
of action for any trademark holder who believes that the holder's mark has
been infringed upon. 3
A. Categoriesof Marks
Courts determine the distinctiveness of a mark by placing it into one of
four categories: generic, descriptive, suggestive, or arbitrary or fanciful. 4
Marks that are "generic with respect to the [associated] product or service can
never be protected as trademarks, because this would be unfair to
competitors." 5 "A descriptive [mark] references a quality or characteristic of
the associated good or service." 6 Examples of descriptive marks include

1. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127 (2010).
2. SHUBHA GHOSH ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
AND THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY 450 (2007).
3. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767-68 (1992) ("The Lanham Act was
intended to make 'actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks' and 'to protect persons
engaged in. . . commerce against unfair competition."') (citing 15 U.S.C.S. § 1127 (1992)).
4. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
5. Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 738-42 (2004) (discussing
the four categories of the "trademark taxonomy").
6. Id. at 739.
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"Arthiticare" for a topical arthritis relief gel 7 and "Pet Pals" for a program
promoting the well-being of pets.8 A suggestive mark is one that suggests a
feature of the good or service and requires the consumer to imagine a
cognitive link between the mark and the nature of the product.9 Terms such as
"brown-in-bag" for transparent plastic cooking bags1 o and "The Money Store"
for money lending services 1 have been held by courts to be suggestive
marks. 12 Arbitrary marks are usually defined as "those that adapt a common
word to an unfamiliar circumstance," 13 such as "Apple" for a brand of
computers. 14 A mark is fanciful if it consists of a word or symbol that has
been "invented solely for [its] use as [a] trademark."1 5 Fanciful marks include
"Xerox" and "Kodak."' 6
On one end of the spectrum, generic marks are not entitled to protection
because they exhibit few, if any, distinctive qualities. 17 On the other end,
arbitrary or fanciful marks enjoy full trademark protection "without the need
of debating whether the term is 'merely descriptive' and with ease of
establishing infringement."' 8 In between generic and arbitrary or fanciful
marks are descriptive marks and suggestive marks.19 These marks acquire
distinction, and thus protection, if they "become distinctive of [an] applicant's
goods in commerce." 20 The distinctiveness necessary to obtain trademark
protection is commonly known as secondary meaning. 2 1 Factors used to find
secondary meaning include the length and manner of the use of the mark or
trade dress, the volume of sales, the amount and methods of advertising,
7. Bernard v. Commerce Drug Co., 964 F.2d 1338, 1339 (2d Cir. 1992).
8. P.A.W. Safety Charities v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., No. 3-99-CV-0212-P, 2000 WL
284193, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2000).
9. Bartow, supra note 5, at 740.
10. Id. at 740-41; In re Application of Reynolds Metals Co., 480 F.2d 902, 904 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
11. Bartow, supra note 5, at 741; The Money Store v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 673-74
(7th Cir. 1982).
12. Bartow, supra note 5, at 740-41.
13. Id. at 741-42.
14. Id. at 743.
15. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 n.12 (2d Cir. 1976).
16. Bartow, supra note 5, at 742.
17. See, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989)
(finding that the term "Murphy Bed" had become generic in referring to a bed that folds out of the
wall, thus denying trademark protection).
18. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11.

19. Id. at 9-11.
20. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. §§
1052(e)-(f) (2006)).
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§13

cmt. e (1995).
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consumer survey evidence, direct consumer testimony, and the defendant's
intent in copying the mark or trade dress. 22 Yet, even with a finding of
distinctiveness or secondary meaning, the functionality doctrine can prevent a
mark from obtaining trademark protection. 23
The term "trade dress" refers to a product's appearance and how it is used
as a source identifier or a mark. 24 In order to serve as a source identifier, a
product's appearance must be distinctive because of its color, shape, texture,
or "other visible or otherwise palpable feature." 25 Trade dress, therefore,
"serves the same function as trademark and is treated the same way by the
Lanham Act" and by the case law interpreting the Lanham Act. 26
B. FunctionalityDoctrine
The Lanham Act prohibits trademark registration for any mark that
"comprises any matter that, as a whole, is functional." 27 A valid mark must be
nonfunctional, as well as source identifying. 28 "[A] product feature is
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the
cost or quality of the article." 29 The functionality test articulated by the
Supreme Court is whether "exclusive use of the [product] feature would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage." 30 The idea
is to prohibit a trademark owner from "inhibiting legitimate competition by
allowing a producer to control a useful product feature." 3 1
A product feature can be functional in three ways: (1) utilitarian, (2)
aesthetic, or (3) communicative. 3 2 In order for a product feature to be
functional in the utilitarian sense, it must be "fit . .. for some purpose [or]
something useful or designed for use." 33 The Supreme Court discussed
22. See id.; see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR

COMPETITION §15:30 (4h ed. 1994); Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 Fed. Supp. 1287, 1297 (D. Kan.
2008).
23. See Univ. of Ala. v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1249 (N.D. Ala. 2009).
24. See Publications Int'l, Ltd. v. Landoll, Inc., 164 F.3d 337, 338 (7th Cir. 1998).
25. Id
26. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 773 (1992).
27. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1052(e)(5) (2010).
28. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995).
29. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850-51 n. 10 (1982).
30. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165.

31. Id at 164.
32. Vincent N. Palladino, Trade Dress Functionality After Traffix: The Lower Courts Divide
Again, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1219, 1224-225 (2003).

33. Id at 1232 (discussing the relationship between functionality and utility) (citing WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1300 (1987)).
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utilitarian functionality at length in the 2001 case TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Marketing Displays, Inc. 34 The case centered around whether a dual-spring
mechanism to permit signs to withstand strong winds was functional and
therefore unable to be trademarked. 35 The Court held that for purposes of
precluding trade dress protection "a feature is also functional when it is
essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or
quality of the device." 36
A product feature is aesthetically functional "if it constitutes 'the actual
benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an
assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a
product . .. ."'37 For this reason, the doctrine of "aesthetic functionality" bars
protection of an aesthetic feature that forms an "important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product . . 8." Aesthetic functionality played a
key role in the court's holding in Wallace InternationalSilversmiths, Inc. v.
Godinger Silver Art Co. 39 In that case, Wallace sued Godinger for trademark
and trade dress infringement after Godinger began selling a line of silverware
that featured a baroque design very similar to Wallace's popular "Grand
Baroque" pattern. 40 The trial court denied the plaintiffs motion, holding that
the design was a functional feature of a silverware style and ineligible for
protection. 4 1 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that "where an
ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and trademark protection would
significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of adequate alternative
designs, the aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such protection." 42
Similar to aesthetic functionality is communicative functionality. 4 3
Communicative functionality is the use of a product feature to communicate
non-source related meanings.44 The case of McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v.

34. See generally Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 33.

37. In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1049 (C.C.P.A.1982) (quoting Int'l Order of Job's
Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980)).
38. See Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952).
39. See Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990).
40. Id at 77.
41. Id. at 78.

42. Id. at 81.
43. Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red Tide of Anti
Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263, 264 (2009).

44. Id. at 282-83(2009). For a discussion of the various ways consumers use trademarks to
communicate social meanings unintended by the mark holder, see generally, Sonia Katyal, Semiotic
Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 489 (2006).
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Heartland Sweeteners 45 provides a great example of communicative
functionality as a bar to trademark protection. In that case, the plaintiff argued
that the colors of packages of artificial sweeteners effectively communicated
the chemical composition of the sweetener to consumers. 4 6 Although the
Third Circuit did not explicitly use the term "communicative functionality" in
its holding, 47 it is clear that this concept was used as a reason to limit
trademark and trade dress rights. 48
III. COLORS AS PROTECTED MARKS
A. In General
"Color is essential to the brand-building process because it's the most
visible first point of communication." 4 9 In fact, "[s]everal color marks are
registered with the [United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)] ...
for tools and construction materials . . . ."Io Consumer products with more
commercial exposure also enjoy the protection of color registration.5 1 Perhaps
the most well known example is the "eye-catching, [female-sigh-inducing,]
robin's-egg blue color" that is registered for boxes and bags from jeweler
Tiffany & Co. 52 A service mark can also consist solely of a color when it is
used in rendering services or advertising for these services.5 3 United Parcel
Service (UPS), for example, has registered "'the color chocolate brown' . . . as
applied to the entire surface of vehicles and uniforms for the service of
transporting and delivering personal property." 54 Additionally, the registered
slogan "What can brown do for you?" broadcasts UPS's intentions to use this
color brown as a source identifying mark.5 5
Courts must consider whether a particular color mark is weak or strong
and whether a color mark is likely to cause source confusion with similar
45. See McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, 511 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2007).
46. Id. at 363.
47. See id.

48. Bartow, supra note 43, at 285.
49. Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and CherryScented Racecar Exhaust: ProtectingNontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773, 777-78

(2005).
50. Id. at 778.
51. Id.

52.
boxes);
53.
54.
55.

Id; Principal Register, see Federal TM Reg. No. 2359351 (registered June 10, 2000) (for the
Federal Reg. No. 2416795 (registered Jan. 2, 2001) (for the bags).
Gilson & LaLonde, supranote 49, at 778.
See Federal TM Reg. No. 2901090 (registered Nov. 9, 2004).
Federal TM Reg. No. 2649286 (registered Nov. 12, 2002).
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shades of that color. 56 Will a certain shade of blue be likely to cause source
confusion with a shade of blue-green? 5 7 White might be generic for kitchen
appliances like coffee machines or toasters, while unexpected colors like neon
green or dark purple could be arbitrary.5 8
B. Colors Obtaining TrademarkProtection
Until 1985, no United States court had granted protection to
color, in and of itself, as a means of marking goods. This was
not based on a theory that color was incapable of functioning
as a trademark, for color, just as words, can convey
Rather, there were considered to be an
information.
insufficient number of different colors to be allocated among
all possible producers of a given class of product. Moreover,
it was said, if protection of color were available, there would
be difficulty distinguishing the protected color from similar
shades of that color.59
In the notorious case of In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.,60 the
Federal Circuit found that Owens-Coming had done everything right. The
company made an overwhelming showing of acquired distinctiveness, having
advertised its pink color mark for home insulation for over thirty years and
having spent over $42 million on consumer advertising. 6 1 Many of these
commercials featured the Pink Panther cartoon character to promote the use of
the pink insulation and used the slogan, "Put your house in the pink." 62 "The
backing of the paper of the insulation bore the trademarked words 'OwensComing,' but the court was convinced that consumers recognized ... the pink
56. See Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 49, at 779.
57. Id
58. See id.
59. Lawrence B. Ebert, Trademark Protection in Color: Do It by the Numbers!, 84 TRADEMARK

REP. 379, 379 (1994). Although the issue of trademark protection of color per se was not before the
Supreme Court in the 1906 case of A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bacom Rope Co.,
the opinion stated in dictum, "[y]ou may register a mark, which is otherwise distinctive, in color, and
that gives you the right to use it in any color you like; but you cannot register a mark of which the
only distinction is the use of a color ..... A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bacom Rope
Co., 201 U.S. 166, 172 (1906); see also, Glenda Labadie-Jackson, Through the Looking Hole of the
Multi-Sensory TrademarkRainbow: Trademark Protectionof ColorPer Se Across Jurisdictions: The
United States, Spain and the European Union, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BuS. 91, 93 (2008)

(discussing the background leading up to the Owens-Corningdecision).
60. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
61. Id. at 1126-127.
62. Id.
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color as a signifier of source" independently from any other featured
trademarks. 63 Other manufacturers of fiberglass insulation were free to
feature "alternative colors into their products, but pink insulation became
Owens-Coming's exclusive prerogative." 64
Five years after the Owens-Corning decision, the Seventh Circuit
contrarily refused to give trademark rights in the color blue to a vendor of
sugar substitutes. 65 The court held that the blue packaging "used in
connection with some symbol or design" could be sufficient for color-linked
trademark protection. 66 In 1993, however, the Eighth Circuit rejected the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning and saw no reason that the color blue could not
function as a source identifier, subject to full trademark protection, for Blue
Max brand splicing tape. 67 This decision widened the circuit split on this hotbutton issue and, consequently, attracted the Supreme Court's certiorarigranting attention. 68
In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,69 the Supreme Court resolved
the controversy and discrepancies among the circuit courts on the issue of
whether a trademark could consist of solely a color. 70 Qualitex, a drycleaning business that colored its cleaning pads a particular shade of greengold, sued Jacobson, a competing business, when Jacobson began using a
similar shade of green-gold on its cleaning pads. 7 1 In reaching its decision,
the Court examined the Lanham Act and ultimately determined that there was
no "obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark." 72
The Court stated that "sometimes, a color will meet ordinary legal trademark
requirements. And, when it does so, no special legal rule prevents color alone
from serving as a trademark." 73 Colors, the Court decided, could reasonably
serve as marks once they had acquired distinctiveness (secondary meaning), as
long as their use was nonfunctional. 74

63. Bartow, supra note 43, at 270.
64. Id

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id at 1027.
Master Distrib., Inc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224-25 (8th Cir. 1993).
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Co., 514 U.S. 159, 174 (1995).
Id

70. Id. at 164.
71. Id. at 161.

72. Id. at 163 (emphasis added).
73. Id at 161.
74. Id at 163-65.

SHADES OF GRAY

2010]

369

C. Colors as FunctionalMarks
Even though the Lanham Act does not inclusively list color alone as a
protectable mark, the Supreme Court has decided that color is indeed capable
of obtaining protection when its use is not functional. 75 "Colors used in
relation to goods or services are used either arbitrarily, functionally, or both.
For many consumer goods, color is arbitrary." 76 Everything from computers
to garbage cans can be made in a variety of colors to suit a range of tastes. In
some situations, the use of color is obviously driven by function.7 7 For
example, Astroturf "is often green because it replaces and is supposed to look
like grass." 78 However, "[c]olor per se is not protectable if it is functional,"
and "[c]olors that serve some useful purpose on products will be found to be
functional and not protectable." 79
The use of color can communicate a myriad of potential messages.
Similar to the McNeil80 case, the Supreme Court has held that "competitors
should be free to copy the color of a medical pill because the color
communicated the type of medication it contained, even though it might also
serve source identifying functions." 8 1 This is yet another example of a court
giving credence to the idea of communicative functionality. 82 Colors can also
communicate messages other than mere ingredient identification. 83 "Colors
provide information the consumers want (green candies are unlikely to be
orange or cherry flavored) even if it is imperfect or incomplete (green candies
may be spearmint flavored, or the color may denote lime)." 84
IV.TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND UNIVERSITY COLOR SCHEMES

Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University v. Smack Apparel was
a high-profile case that considered the issue of whether university color

75. Id at 162.
76. Bartow, supra note 43, at 272.
77. Id
78. Id
79. Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 49, at 787. For example, trademark protection was denied to
bright orange biohazard bags because the bright orange color served to alert the user that the contents
of the bags were hazardous. See American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Fisher Scientific Co., No. 84 C
8634, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11000, *32 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 1988).
80. See McNeil Nutritional, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, 511 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2007).
81. Bartow, supra note 43, 285 (citing Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853
(1982)).
82. See id
83. Id.

84. Id.
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schemes are protectable under the Lanham Act. 85 The Smack Apparel court
ultimately held that university color schemes could obtain secondary meaning,
could cause consumer confusion, and are not functional. 86 This issue has yet
to be decided by the Supreme Court, but there is case law both following and
criticizing Smack Apparel.87
A. Board ofSupervisors ofLouisiana State University v. Smack Apparel
In Smack Apparel, four universities-Louisiana State University (LSU),
Ohio State University (OSU), Oklahoma University (OU), and the University
of Southern California (USC)-alleged that the defendant, Smack Apparel,
"engaged in unfair competition by selling shirts bearing the distinctive two
colors used by the universities, along with other symbols which identify the
universities." 88 The universities owned trademark registrations for their
initials and names but not for their unregistered color schemes. 89 Yet, each
school "adopted a particular color combination as its school colors" well over
a century ago and had spent "millions of dollars over the years in marketing
and promoting items bearing their initials and school colors." 90 Smack
Apparel designed and sold a number of t-shirts "bearing the distinctive two
colors used by the universities" that the universities claimed infringed upon
their trademarks and their rights.91
The court recognized that the schools' color schemes had been used for
over one hundred years on different materials, brochures, media guides, and
alumni materials. 92 The fact that many people refer to the universities as
"purple and gold for LSU, crimson and creme for OU, scarlet and gray for
OSU, and cardinal and gold for USC" led the court to believe that the nature
of the use of the color schemes created a high probability of secondary

85. Bd. of Supervisors of La. St. Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d. 465 (5th Cir. 2008),
aff'd 438 F. Supp. 2d 653 (E.D. La. 2006).
86. Smack Apparel, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 661-62.
87. See, e.g., Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. Tex. 2010);
Xtreme Lashes, LLC v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. Tex. 2009).
88. Smack Apparel, 438 F. Supp 2d. at 655. "OU . . . 'Bourbon Street or Bust' (with the 'ou' in
'Bourbon' in a different typestyle) (front), 'Show Us Your Beads!' (with the 'ou' in 'your' in a
different typestyle) and 'Sweet as Sugar!' (back) . . . LSU: 'Beat Oklahoma' (front), and 'And Bring
it Back to the Bayou!' and '2003 College Football National Championship' (back) .... ." Id.
89. Id
90. Id. at 655, 658 n.3.
91. Id. at 655.
92. See id. at 658. Additionally, the universities used their color schemes to advertise to
students, faculty, alumni, and the general public. Id.
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meaning. 93 Most importantly, the court found that Smack Apparel had used
the schools' colors with the specific intent of identifying the universities as the
subject of the message in the design of the t-shirts. 94
B. Texas Tech University v. Spiegelberg
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas relied
on the Smack Apparel holding for its decision in Texas Tech University v.
Spiegelberg.95
In Spiegelberg, the defendant owned two merchandising
stores, one across from the Texas Tech campus and the other
Spiegelberg
in a mall in downtown Lubbock, Texas.
decorated the stores with Texas Tech's [school] colors, scarlet
and black, and sold Texas Tech merchandise. Texas Tech
sued, alleging trademark infringement. Relying on Smack
Apparel, the Spiegelberg court found that "the scarlet and
black color scheme of a product can serve the important
function of showing that the product is officially licensed by
Texas Tech." The court based its ruling on the fact that the
color [scheme] acquired "a secondary meaning which
'identifies and distinguishes' the products," such that
customers associate products marketed and sold in Lubbock
adorned with scarlet and black as products licensed by Texas
Tech." 96
C. University of Kansas v. Sinks
The case of University of Kansas v. Sinks has startling factual similarities
to Smack Apparel but a very different outcome. 97 The University of Kansas
(KU) brought a trademark infringement action against several defendants for
the production of red and blue t-shirts bearing university logos. 98 For more
than one hundred years, KU has used the colors "crimson and blue" as parts of
its Jayhawk mascot and in connection with its educational services, athletics,

93. Id at 655.
94. Id at 661.
95. See generally Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 510 (N.D. Tex. 2006).
96. Jeremiah Kline, Black and Blue: An Examination of Trademarking University Color
Schemes, 16 SPORTS LAW J. 47, 60-61 (2009).
97. See generally Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d. 1216, 1235 (D. Kan. 2008).
98. Id.
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student life, advertising, events, and website. 99 KU does not, however, own a
registered trademark for these crimson and blue colors themselves.' 0 0
Nevertheless, "KU monitors authorized uses of its color scheme and has set
standards to instruct KU representatives and licensees as to how the crimson
and blue color scheme is to be presented." 0 1 The District Court of Kansas
held that the defendants infringed on KU's trademarks.1 02 Of the 206 shirts at
issue, the court found only a few to be infringing.1 03 Furthermore, the
plaintiff argued that the defendant's use of the crimson and blue color scheme
alone was enough to constitute infringement. 104
D. University ofAlabama v. New Life Art, Inc.
The case of University ofAlabama v. New Life Art, Inc. shows one court's
stern rejection of a university owning trademark rights in its color scheme. 105
More importantly, a reason why the color scheme was not protected was
clearly articulated.10 6 The defendant in this case was a corporation organized
by a well-known sports artist, Daniel Moore, who painted artistic renderings of
university football events. 107 The University of Alabama (Alabama) and the
defendant had a licensing agreement from 1991 until 2000, at which time the
defendant took the position that the paintings did not need to be licensed. 0 8
Alabama disagreed, arguing that the University's team uniform colors of
crimson and white were protectable trade dress and Moore could not sell
paintings depicting these uniform colors without a license. 109 Alabama
subsequently filed a trademark infringement lawsuit, seeking royalties from
more than twenty of Moore's paintings and demanding that Moore license any
99. Id. at 1297; see also University of Kansas, http://www.ku.edu (last visited May 2, 2010).
100. Sinks, 565 F. Supp. 2d. at 1235.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1254-55.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 1302-303. On April 12, 2010, the defendants agreed to a Consent Injunction and
Settlement Agreement in exchange for KU's full release of the judgment. Among other things, the
Agreement stipulates that the defendants are permanently enjoined from ordering, producing,
manufacturing, distributing, selling, advertising, promoting, or marketing "any product that is red or
blue (or red and blue) or that makes prominent use of the colors red or blue when combined with any
of the words or symbols listed below which Defendants are prohibited from using, except as
otherwise specifically permitted."

See Kansas Athletics Resolves Lawsuit with Local Apparel

Manufacturer,WIBW.COM, Apr. 12, 2010, http://www.wibw.com/sports/headlines/90696844.html.
105. Univ. of Ala. v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243-244 (N.D. Ala. 2009).
106. See generally id.

107. Id. at 1240.
108. Id. at 1244.
109. Id.
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future paintings.I10
The District Court for the Northern District of Alabama issued a
memorandum opinion holding that Alabama did not have trademark rights in
the football team colors and, thus, the defendant did not need a license to use
the colors in his paintings. 1"
The marks here concerned are the uniforms and their colors. These
"marks" do not lend themselves to [trademark] type designations; nor would
the general public usually consider them to be "marks." They are descriptive at
best and are not inherently distinctive. The following Division 1-A football
teams have crimson as part of their colors: Indiana, Kansas, New Mexico
State, Oklahoma, Southern Methodist, Utah, Washington State ... and
Harvard ....

New Mexico State, Utah and Harvard all have crimson and
112

white colors.
The court clarified that its holding only extended to the use of the
uniform colors in artistic paintings and prints; such works would not be
allowed to use the University's logos, symbols, or seals without potentially
infringing on the University of Alabama's trademark rights. 113
V. COLOR ME BAD? RECENT COLOR SCHEME CONTROVERSY
Although the courts are split as to whether to extend trademark protection
to a university's color scheme per se, one company decided to take a risk and
use the color schemes of not just one, but several, prominent universities in a
nationwide marketing campaign.11 4 Another company went one step further
and is now looking for a court to declare that universities do not own
trademark rights to their own color schemes." 5
110. Id. at 1243.

111. Id. at 1246-48.
112. Id. at 1249. The court even went on to list "other teams with variations of red[,]" including
"Arizona, Arkansas, Arkansas State, Ball State, Fresno State, Georgia, Houston, Iowa State, Miami of
Ohio, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina State, Northern Illinois, Ohio State, Rutgers, San Diego
State, Stanford and Wisconsin." Id.
113. Id. at 1250. On January 7, 2010, the University of Alabama appealed the district court's
decision to the Eleventh Circuit. The case is number 10-10092. On June 30, 2010, twenty-seven
schools, including both Louisiana State University and University of Kansas, filed a Brief of Amici
Curiae supporting the University of Alabama. See Andy Hyland, KU Joins Motion in Support of
Trademark Lawsuit Filed by

University of Alabama, KUSPORTS.COM,

July

22,

2010,

http://www2.kusports.com/news/2010/jul/22/ku-joins-motion-support-trademark-lawsuit-filed-un/.
114. John Hechinger, Team-Color Bud Cans Leave Colleges Flat, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2009,

availableat http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125081310939148053.html.
115. See generally David

Elbert, Lawsuit

Tells Schools

They

Don't Own

Colors,

DESMOINESREGISTER.CoM, Apr. 1, 2010, http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/2010033 I/
BUSINESS/100331034/1OO1NEWS/Lawsuit-tells-schools-they-don-t-own-colors.
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A. The Bud Light Fan Can
In August 2009, right before the start of college football season,
Anheuser-Busch began its "Team Pride" marketing campaign.11 6 This
campaign was primarily directed toward college football tailgaters; in its
lighthearted television commercials for Bud Light beer, many popular tailgate
items were reworked to create functional, yet absurd, "tailgate approved"
products." 7 However, the centerpieces of the Team Pride program were the
"Fan Cans:" Bud Light cans adorned in twenty-seven different color schemes
designed to represent colleges across the country.118 Advertisements for the
Fan Cans announced that they "were made for game day" and suggested that
college football fans should "show [their] true colors with Bud Light. .. ."119
The Fan Can promotion sparked a firestorm of controversy. 120 Concerned
with protecting their trademarks and avoiding consumer confusion, more than
twenty-five universities formally asked Anheuser-Busch to cease its Fan Can
promotion.12 1 Additionally, the Collegiate Licensing Company, which
represents about 200 colleges, the National Collegiate Athletic Association,
and other school sports organizations complained to Anheuser-Busch about
potential trademark law violations.1 22 In response, Anheuser-Busch pointed
out that the cans did not bear the logos or names of any one school. 123
Because the cans featured only the schemes, it was ultimately up to the
consumer to associate the colors with a particular alma mater or sports team.
Nevertheless, Anheuser-Busch pulled the Fan Cans from the communities
where affected universities had complained.124
B. Madison County Winery, LLC v. State oflowa
During the heyday of the Fan Cans controversy, a small Iowa winery

116. Hechinger, supra note 114.
117. Steve Wood, Are You Ready for Some Tailgating?, COURIER-POST, Oct. 1, 2009, at NaN.
Some of these "tailgate approved" products included a "Grooler" (a hybrid between a grill and a
cooler) and a "Tailgate Companion" (a vest outfitted with pockets for condiments and grilling tools to
be worn by a large breed of dog, such as a Labrador Retriever). Id
118. Hechinger, supra note 114.
119. Id
120. See id.

121. Id These universities included the University of Michigan, the University of Colorado,
Oklahoma State University, Texas A&M University, and Boston College. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id
124. Anheuser-Busch

Pulls

http://www.msnbc.com/id/32555454/.

Some

'Fan

Cans,'

MSNBC.cOM,

Aug.

25,

2009,
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introduced what soon proved to be very controversial bottles of wine. 12 5
Madison County Winery, located just outside of St. Charles, Iowa, began
selling bottles of "Iowa Gold" and "State Red" wines. 12 6 "Iowa Gold, a blend
a
of Iowa-grown vignoles and chardonnay grapes, was sold in a bottle with
black and gold label. State Red is a dry red blend of cabernet sauvignon and
marechal foch, which was sold in a bottle with a red and yellow label." 1 27
Naturally, both the University of Iowa and Iowa State University sent
cease-and-desist letters to Madison County Winery. 128 Winery owner Doug
Bakker tried to comply with the Universities' requests and stopped using the
words "Iowa" and "State."' 29 However, he continued to use the color
schemes of black and gold and red and yellow on labels that simply said
"Gold" and "Red."l 30 When the universities insisted that the winery could not
use these colors either, Bakker decided to sue. 131 "The lawsuit says the state
schools' [sic] overstepped their trademark authority, and in doing so owe
Madison County Winery an unspecified amount of damages, as well as legal
fees in the case."1 32 "If the winery does win . .. the decision could have
widespread impact on the ability of Iowa and Iowa State 'to dissuade others'
from using the colors and words in commercial applications." 133
VI. UNIVERSITY COLOR SCHEMES AS UNPROTECTABLE UNDER THE
LANHAM ACT

Although the Supreme Court has yet to determine whether the protection
of color as a trademark can extend to university color schemes, there are many
reasons why university color schemes should not be protected as trademarks
under the Lanham Act. The Sinks case reasoned that the color scheme alone

125. See Elbert,supra note 115.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. An August 18, 2009 letter to the winery from Dale Arens, the University of Iowa
trademark licensing director, promised legal action "if [the winery does] not immediately cease the
unlawful use of [the universities'] logos." Id. Additionally, "a [September] 22, 2009, letter from
Licensing Resource Group, which [Iowa State University] uses to police brand licensing, was more
specific. It said that State Red labels would 'confuse the public into believing that Iowa State
University sponsors or approves of [the winery's] products."' Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The lawsuit indicates that the legal situations of the two schools are not identical. For
example, it notes that Iowa State University's registration of the word mark "I State" specifically
states "color is not claimed as a feature of the mark." Id.
133. Id.
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did not merit trademark protection.134 New Life Art states that university color
schemes are functional and therefore barred from gaining trademark
protection.1 35 The Smack Apparel decision examined the strength of
university marks, the use of the marks in advertising, and the volume of sales
to determine that use of a university's color scheme can cause consumer
confusion, and thus, the Lanham Act affords protection to the universities'
color schemes. University color schemes may acquire secondary meaning
through affiliation and advertising, but this secondary meaning may vary
depending on what part of the country is being examined.1 36 Even with
secondary meaning, university color schemes are functional and not
protectable under the Lanham Act. 137
To gain registration in the Principal Register or common law protection
under the Lanham Act, a trade dress must not be "functional." 1 38 That is, the
configuration of shapes, designs, colors, or materials that make up the trade
dress in question must not serve a utility or function outside of creating
recognition in the consumer's mind.' 3 9 Yet, the New Life Art court explicitly
stated that university color schemes perform a function: "They help avoid
confusion as to team members for the benefit of officials, opposing team
members and spectators." 40 Interestingly enough, the University of
Alabama's own words in its complaint against New Life Art acknowledged
that "the first use of [the color] crimson by Harvard was 'so that spectators
could differentiate Harvard's crew team from other teams during a regatta in

1858."'l141
In addition to having a useful function, university color schemes are
As previously discussed, communicative
communicatively functional.
to communicate a non-source related
mark
functionality is the use of a
meaning, including social meanings. Loyal alumni often wear their school
colors while attending collegiate athletic events to communicate their affinity
for a particular team. Colloquially, one might accurately say that blue and
gold are the trademark colors of Marquette University,142 but wearing these
134. See generally Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 644 Fed. Supp. 1287 (D. Kan. 2008).
135. See generally Univ. of Ala. v. New Life Art, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2009).
136. See Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. v. Smack Apparel Co., 550 F.3d. 465, 477-78 (5th
Cir. 2008).
137. MCCARTHY, supra note 22, at § 15.3; see also New Life Art, 677 Fed. Supp. at 1249.
138. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
139. Id.
140. New Life Art, 677 F. Supp. 2d. at 1249.
141. Id. at 1247. Alabama used this evidence to support their incorrect argument that "nothing
about the color scheme serves a functional purpose." Id.
142. See Marquette University, http://www.marquette.edu (last visited May 2, 2010).
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colors to university sports events communicates support for the Marquette
University Golden Eagles outside of the linear realm of commercial trademark
use. Moreover, the Sinks case held that several of the t-shirts that KU thought
to be "infringing" were not "infringing" if they only featured the university's
color scheme. 14 3 Again, this is because the use of the colors here was not to
identify the source of the product, but to communicate an allegiance to the
University of Kansas. 14 4
In addition to their utilitarian and communicative functionalities,
university color schemes are also aesthetically functional.1 45 The Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition provides that, if a design's "aesthetic value" lies
in its ability to "confer[] a significant benefit that cannot practically be
duplicated by the use of alternative designs," the design is "functional." 46
"The ultimate test of aesthetic functionality, as with utilitarian functionality, is
whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder
competition." 47 Courts have historically placed the importance of allowing
consumers the ability to obtain products in the colors they prefer above an
entity's desire to make exclusive use of a color.148 Because farmers had an
aesthetic preference for green farm equipment, one district court refused to
allow the John Deere Company a trademark for the color green with respect to
farm machinery. 149 Because boat owners prefer outboard motors to be black
for aesthetic reasons, the Federal Circuit held that a single outboard motor
company could not use trademark law to make itself the exclusive
manufacturer of black outboard motors.'s 0 If courts continue to follow this
precedent, they will likely deny university color schemes trademark protection
for the same reason: to protect the consumer's ability to obtain products in the
colors they prefer. Clothing, furniture, office supplies, and other consumer
goods are manufactured in every color imaginable because consumers find
these colors to be appealing and desirable.151 Marquette's interest in its blue
and gold color scheme should not prevent consumers from buying mittens,
143. Univ. of Kan. v. Sinks, 565 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1242 (2008) ("[T]he distinctiveness acquired
by plaintiffs for its marks, does not dictate a finding of liability against defendants for every blue or
red shirt it produces with a possible reference to KU on it."). Id.
144. See id. at 1242.
145.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 21 at

§ 17, cmt c, pp.

175-76.

146. Id.
147. Id. at 176.
148. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982); Brunswick
Corp. v. British Seagull, Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
149. See Deere, 560 F. Supp. at 91.
150. See Brunswick, 35 F.3d at 1532.

151. Bartow, supra note 43, at 273.
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sweaters, notebooks, or any other product that happens to be blue and gold in
color. 152

True, with enough exposure "via relentless advertising and expansive
market permeation," the color scheme of blue and gold could be conceivably
linked with Marquette University in consumers' minds. 153 This is not,
however, an adequate justification for overcoming the functionality doctrine
and allowing universities to monopolize particular color combinations through
trademark law.154 "Mere association does not mean that a color [scheme] is
functioning as a trademark." 5 5
VII. CONCLUSION
Colors alone can make words or symbols more distinctive marks, but they
signify too many things to function as effective stand-alone trademarks. No
company is going to use only a color to identify its goods and services. UPS is
not going to stop using the mark "United Parcel Service" and let the color
brown be its sole identifier. Nor would Tiffany & Co. eliminate "Tiffany" and
use its blue bags and boxes exclusively. Similarly, no university is going to
abandon its use of its logos and mascots and rely only on its two-color scheme.
Colors are almost always functional from a utilitarian, aesthetic, or
communicative perspective. The fact that they may also have a secondary
meaning does not automatically overcome the barrier of the functionality
doctrine.
Universities may enthusiastically register their color schemes, but they
would never actually use the color scheme by itself. This is because the color
scheme is not perceived by consumers as a trademark but rather as
aesthetically pleasing, emotionally appealing, or even functional from a
utilitarian perspective. The issue of whether a university can trademark its
color scheme will come before the courts again. Recent controversy over the
use of university color schemes has illustrated how eager universities are to
protect their interests in color schemes. However, the most recent case law
has denied protection to university color schemes per se, and courts should
152. See generally id.

153. Id at 268.
154. Id.

155. Id. For a more detailed discussion on the geographical limitations for universities with
similar color schemes, see generally Kline, supra note 96, at 73-78. Moreover, the associations
attached to particular color schemes vary dramatically based on geographical location. Many
universities share similar, if not identical, color schemes. In Wisconsin, blue and gold can signify an
allegiance with Marquette University. However, in Michigan and many other parts of the county,
these same shades of blue and gold (also known as "maize") show a connection to the University of
Michigan. See University of Michigan, http://www.umich.edu (last visited May 2, 2010).
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continue to follow this precedent.
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